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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FULLAM, District Judge: 
 
The government appeals from the district court's pretrial 
dismissal of two counts of an indictment. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S3731, and the scope of 
review is plenary. 
 
The two dismissed counts charged the defendant James 
V. DeLaurentis, the Supervisor of Detectives for the 
Hammonton Police Department, in Hammonton, New 
Jersey, with violations of 18 U.S.C. S666 (theft or bribery 
involving programs receiving federal funds). The dismissal 
was based upon the district court's conclusion that the 
government's evidence did not suffice to show a nexus 
between the alleged bribes and any federal interest or 
program, under the standards set forth in this court's 
recent decision in United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672 (3d 
Cir. 1999). We conclude that the order appealed from must 
be reversed, for both procedural and substantive reasons. 
 
We address first the procedural issue. Unless there is a 
stipulated record, or unless immunity issues are 
implicated, a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment is 
not a permissible vehicle for addressing the sufficiency of 
the government's evidence. See United States v. Knox, 396 
U.S. 77, 83 n.7 (1969), United States v. Gallagher, 602 F.2d 
1139, 1142 (3d Cir. 1979) cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 1040, 
and cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v. 
King, 581 F.2d 800, 802 (10th Cir. 1978). Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes dismissal of an 
indictment if its allegations do not suffice to charge an 
offense, but such dismissals may not be predicated upon 
the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the indictment's 
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charges. See United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 78-79 
(1962). 
 
In civil cases, of course, the summary judgment 
procedures contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56 may be utilized to test, pretrial, the sufficiency of the 
evidence to establish triable issues of fact; but there is no 
corollary in criminal cases. The government is entitled to 
marshal and present its evidence at trial, and have its 
sufficiency tested by a motion for acquittal pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. 
 
We recognize that the district court may have adopted the 
novel procedure followed here in order to preserve the 
government's right of appeal, but that result could readily 
have been achieved by a post-verdict ruling under Rule 29. 
Be that as it may, we simply cannot approve dismissal of 
an indictment on the basis of predictions as to what the 
trial evidence will be. The charges set forth in the two 
dismissed counts substantially track the language of the 
statute; the indictment is sufficient on its face. Indeed, the 
defendant did not, and does not now, challenge the 
dismissed counts as facially insufficient. The case must 
therefore be remanded to the district court for trial on all 
counts. 
 
In addition to the procedural error discussed above, it is 
our view that the district judge mis-applied the substantive 
law, as clarified in the Zwick case, supra. On this issue, we 
labor under the same handicap as the district court, 
namely, the fact that there has not yet been a trial, hence 
no actual assessment of the government's evidence can be 
made. In the interest of providing guidance to the district 
court for the future conduct of the trial, however, we 
consider it appropriate to register our firm conclusion that, 
if the government's evidence is to the same effect as the 
parties and the district court have thus far assumed it will 
be, it would suffice to permit a jury to convict the defendant 
of violating 18 U.S.C. S666. 
 
The statute criminalizes bribery committed by "an agent 
. . . of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any 
agency thereof . . . in connection with any business, 
transaction, or series of transactions of such . . . 
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government[,] or agency involving anything of value of 
$5,000 or more . . . ," but only if 
 
       the organization, government, or agency receives, in 
       any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 
       under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, 
       subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of 
       Federal assistance. 
 
18 U.S.C. S666. 
 
It is undisputed that the defendant was, at all relevant 
times, the Supervisor of Detectives in the Hammonton New 
Jersey Police Department, and was thus an agent of a local 
government or agency. It is also undisputed that the town 
of Hammonton was the recipient of federal funds, 
amounting to at least $25,000 per year for a three-year 
period. A literal reading of the statute would suggest that, 
if the defendant solicited or accepted bribes to influence or 
reward him in the performance of his police duties, he 
would be subject to punishment under the statute. But, as 
this court decided in United States v. Zwick, supra, and as 
other courts have also determined, e.g. United States v. 
Phillips, 219 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2000), the literal language 
of the statute must be considered in conjunction with the 
concepts of federalism embodied in our Constitution. For a 
conviction under S666, therefore, the evidence must show 
some connection between the defendant's bribery activities 
and the funds supplied by the federal government, or the 
programs supported by those federal funds. 
 
In United States v. Zwick, supra, this court undertook an 
exhaustive review of the judicial decisions which have 
addressed the somewhat elusive definition of the required 
nexus. That discussion need not be repeated here. We 
concluded that, although it is not necessary to show that 
the bribery activities of the defendant actually impacted the 
federal funds themselves, or had a direct bearing on the 
expenditure of those funds, it must appear that there is 
some connection between the bribery activities and a 
federal interest. In the Zwick case itself, the federal funds 
consisted of a small disaster relief fund which was used for 
snow-removal and flood-control. The bribery occurred in 
connection with developers being granted sewer access 
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permits and landscaping contracts which, so far as the 
evidence disclosed, were totally unrelated to the federal 
grant or the activities funded by the federal grant. The 
court set aside the conviction, but remanded for a new trial 
to afford the government an opportunity to attempt to show 
such a connection. (The trial judge had ruled that no such 
connection need be shown). 
 
In the present case, the defendant was the Supervisor of 
Detectives, and among his other duties he was assigned to 
assist the New Jersey Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control 
in the enforcement of the state alcoholic beverage laws, 
under the supervision of the chief of police, who was the 
defendant's father. The federal funds were received from the 
Department of Justice under the Community Oriented 
Policing Services Program ("COPS Fast"), and were used by 
the Hammonton Police Department to pay the salary of an 
additional police officer (who happened to be the 
defendant's brother) for street patrol duties. 
 
The indictment charges that the defendant accepted 
bribes for interceding with the town council to permit 
renewal of the license of a particular bar which had been 
the focus of much police activity because of fighting, drug 
sales, disorderly conduct, underage drinking, public 
drunkenness, public urination, public lewdness, etc. 
 
The evidence outlined by the government would permit a 
rational jury to conclude that the defendant's successful 
intercession enabled this problem establishment to remain 
open, necessitating a disproportionate allocation of police 
manpower, to the detriment of street patrol activities 
elsewhere in the town. Indeed, the official records 
submitted by the government purport to show that, on 
several occasions, the very same officer whose salary is 
being paid with federal funds was dispatched to this 
problem bar to quell disturbances or make arrests. 
 
Thus, this case differs markedly from the Zwick  situation. 
It more nearly resembles Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 
52 (1997). In that case, the federal government provided 
funds for physical improvements to a state prison, and paid 
a per diem fee for each federal prisoner housed there. A 
corrections officer accepted bribes to permit a federal 
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prisoner to have conjugal visits. The Supreme Court had no 
difficulty in concluding that the defendant was properly 
convicted under S666. 
 
When it supplied the town of Hammonton with $75,000 
to strengthen its police patrols, the federal government had 
a legitimate interest in discouraging police corruption 
affecting the patrol activities it was financing. There is no 
Constitutional impediment to applying S666 in this case. 
 
The district court's order dismissing Counts Two and Six 
of the indictment is vacated, and this case is remanded for 
trial on all counts of the indictment. 
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